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I~ ~fHE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
s·r,\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
FR.\~K JERR\~ OWENS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9998. 
I3RIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from a conviction for the crime 
of forgery in violation of 76-26-1, U.C.A. 1953, upon jury 
trial in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, 
lTtah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On July 9, 1963, the appellant was tried and convicted 
of forgery, in violation of 76-26-1, U.C.A. 1953, by utter-
ing and passing a forged money order. The case was tried 
by a jury which returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial 
court committed the appellant to the State Prison for the 
indeterminate period provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the trial court's judgment 
should be affirmed. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent will accept the appellant's statement 
of facts, except to the extent that they may appear differ-
ently or be added to in the argument portion of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY EVIDENCE 
TENDING TO SHOW ANY ASSOCIATION OF THE DE-
FENDANT WITH Al\TY OTHER CRIMINALS; FURTHER, 
APPELLANT HAS NO BASIS TO CLAIM ANY ERROR RE-
LATING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE APPELLANT BY 
WITNESSES FROM PHOTOGRAPHS. 
The appellant contends in Point I of his brief that the 
jury had before it evidence of the accused's association with 
other known criminals. No testimony of any kind was re-
ceived by the jury which in any way indicated that the 
appellant associated with criminals prior to or during the 
time of the commission of the offense. Consequently, the 
appellant's assertion is not quite correct. 
A reading of the appellant's brief results in the con-
clusion that the appellant is in fact complaining that the 
trial jury received evidence of a pre-trial identification of 
the appellant as the person who uttered Exhibit A, the 
forged money order. The identification of the appellant 
as the culprit was made by Kenneth Bramwell, the operator 
of Bramwell's Market in Ogden, Utah, from "mug" photo-
graphs of the appellant and other persons (R. 11). The 
photographs were presented to Mr. Bramwell by Officer 
Warner Bruestle of the Ogden City Police Department 
prior to trial, in an effort to have Mr. Bramwell identify 
the person who gave him the forged money order (R. 38). 
Mr. Bramwell identified the appellant from the photo-
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3 
~raphs presented ( R. 11 ) and the trial court heard the 
trstirnonv of ~lr. Bram\vt:ll to the effect that he made a 
prt'vious, identification of the appellant from the photo-
graphs (R. 1 L 38). 
Subsequently, Mr. Bramwell was cross-examined inten-
sivclv bv defense counsel concerning the identification of 
the ~~pp~llant as being the individual responsible for pass-
ing the forged money order. 
At the time of opening statements, counsel for the ap-
pellant indicated that he would rely for a defense on the 
contention that the appellant was not the individual who 
had cotnmitted the crime, and had been improperly identi-
fied by the victims. Defense counsel endeavored to show 
that the prior identification of the appellant as the culprit 
by ~Ir. Bramwell from the photographs given him by the 
Ogden Police, was a confused and inaccurate identification. 
Xo objection at anytime was raised by the appellant to the 
use of the photographs nor to their admission ( R. 40) . 
It is submitted that whatever claim of error the appel-
lant might have had to the use of the photographs at trial 
has not been preserved on appeal since the appellant took 
no objection. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., 
Sec. 348, notes: 
"It is a general rule that, in order to take advantage of the admis-
sion of evidence by the trial court as error and to secure a reversal 
of its judgment upon appeal, the evidence must be objected to in 
the trial court. Likewise where no objection is made to cross-
e."<amin~tion. neither the propriety thereof, nor the competency of 
the testlmony brought out thereby may be questioned on appeal." 
The appellant failed to make any objection to the re-
ceipt of any evidence relating to his identification from the 
mug shots, nor "·as any objection raised to receiving the 
pictures in evidence to allow the jury to see the nature of 
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4 
the identification. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, Sec. 
350, notes: 
"The proper time to object to the introduction of evidence is when 
it .becomes ~pp~rent that .er:or will be commit~ed by receiving 
evidence which 1s not admissible, as when the evidence is offered 
***" 
Section 351 also notes: 
"Any objection to the admissibility of evidence is waived by failure 
to object thereto. If defendant fails to object to evidence when 
first offered, he waives its incompetency. * * * " 
Further, it should be noted that no effort was ever made by 
the appellant to have the evidence stricken or to have the 
jury instructed as to its limited use. As a consequence, it is 
submitted that since the appellant made no effort to void 
the error he now seeks to take advantage of on appeal, he 
may not, therefore, claim prejudice. 
Secondly, it is submitted that the receipt of the evidence 
was proper. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1130, notes: 
"Ordinarily, when a witness is asked to identify the assailant, or 
thief, or other person who is the subject of his testimony, the wit-
ness' act of pointing out the accused (or other person) then and 
there in the court-room, is of little testimonial force. After all that 
has intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would 
not have come to believe in the person's identity. The failure to 
recognize would tell for the accused; but the affirmative recogni-
tion might mean little against him. 
The psychology of the situation is practically the s~e as when 
Recent Contrivance is alleged. To corroborate the Witness, there-
fore, it is entirely proper (on the principle of § 1129, ante) to 
prove that at a former time, when t?e suggesti.o~s o.f others .coul~ 
not have intervened to create a fancied recognition m the Witness 
mind, he recognized and declared the present accused to be the 
person.***'' 
Although it must be admitted that there are jurisdic-
tions which have ruled to the contrary, it would appear 
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that the majority of courts have allowed the use of such evi-
dence. In 22A, C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 725, p. 1011, it 
j, stated: 
uother decisions however' broadly hold that evidence of extra-
judicial identifi~ation is admissi~le, as an exception to t~e .hear~ay 
r·ulr and that a witness may testtfy as to another person s tdentrfi-
c.lti~n of a person, thing, or place. So, it has been held that testi-
mony as to the mere fact that another person identified, describe.d, 
or pointed out something is not inadmissible as hearsay; and a wtt-
nt·ss may testify to another's description of a person or place for 
the mere purpose of explaining action taken in connection there-
with. Also, a witness may testify to a statement made to a person 
resulting in his failure to make an identification." 
In People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 191 P.2d 1 
( 1948) , the California Supreme Court had occasion to 
consider whether or not evidence of a previous identifica-
tion of the accused as the culprit could be received in evi-
dence to bolster a subsequent identification at trial. Mr. 
Justice Traynor commented: 
"Defendant contends that the admission of evidence pertaining to 
certain nonjudicial identification of defendant was erroneous. 
The prosecutrix testified that she identified defendant in a police 
lineup, and a police officer testified that he was present when the 
prosecutrix made the identification. Here again, defendant made 
no objection to the introduction of the testimony of which he now 
complains, but even if he had this evidence of previous non judicial 
identification would have been admissible. 
'~narily \vhen a witness is asked to identify the assailant, or 
thtet, or other person who is the subject of his testimony, the wit-
ness' act of pointing out the accused (or other person), then and 
there in the courtroom, is of little testimonial force. After all that 
has intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would 
not ha~·e come to believe in the person's identity. The failure to 
~ogn_tze would t.ell for t?e accused; but the affirmative recogni-
tion nught mean httle agatnst him. 
The psychology of the situation is practically the same as when 
~ecent Contrivance is alleged. To corroborate the witness, there-
tore, it is entirely proper* * *to prove that at a former time when 
the suggestions of others could not have intervened to c;eate a 
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fancied recognition in the witness' mind, he recognized and de-
clared the present accused to be the person. If, moreover (as 
sometimes is done) the person \\·as then so placed among others 
that all probability of suggestion (by seeing him hand-cuffed for 
example) is still further removed, the evidence becomes stro~ger. 
The typical illustration is that of the identification of an accused 
person at the time of arrest. * * *' IV Wigmore on Evidence, 
3d Ed., p. 208. 
The foregoing rule stated by Wigmore is not accepted in all juris-
dictions, but the weight of recent authority is in accord with his 
views. * * * " 
In a case very similar to the instant one, People v. Ford, 
345 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1959), a protest was made that the jury 
was allowed to receive evidence of a previous identification 
of the accused by a witness from "mug" shots. The court 
commented on this objection and found it unmeritorious, 
stating: 
"Authorities bearing directly on this point involve for the most part 
identification prior to court appearance by way of police show-up 
or of his person at a place other than the police station. Appellant's 
real objection seems to be the manner in which the prior identifi-
cation was proved, by the introduction into evidence of the 'mug' 
photograph, which he claims imputed to him a prior criminal 
record. Generally, if evidence be material and relevant to an issue 
in a criminal trial, even though it tends to be prejudicial, it is 
nevertheless admissible when its probative value outweighs the 
possible prejudicial effect (People v. Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 301, 3?9 
P.2d 431) ; and a determination thereof lies within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court * * *." 
In People v. Aquirre, 332 P.2d 4 78 (Cal. 1958), the 
court, citing the Slobodian case, supra, affirmed the use of 
prior identification from pictures and a lineup. 
Most recently, in People v. Gould, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 
P.2d 865 ( 1960), the California Supreme Court again con-
sidered the question of the admissibility of an extrajudicial 
identification of the accused by a witness. The identifica-
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tion by the witness \vas made from a photograph. Mr. Jus-
tice 'fraynor, again speaking for the court, stated: 
"Evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admissible, not only 
to corroborate an identification made at the trial (People v. Slobo-
dion, 11 Cal. 2d 555, 560, 191 P.2d 1), but as independent evi-
dence of identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be corrobo-
rated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first im-
peached (People v. Hardenbrook, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 351, 309 P.2d 
·~24: People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 753-754, 104 P.2d 794), 
rvidence of an extra-judicial identification is admitted regardless 
of whether the testin1onial identification is impeached, because 
the earlier identification has greater probative value than an 
identification n1ade in the courtroom after the suggestions of 
others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to 
create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. People v. Slobo-
dion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 559-560, 191 P.2d 1; United States v. For-
zano, 2 Cir., 190 F .2d 687, 689; see People v. Hood, 140 Cal. App. 
2d 585, 588, 295 P.2d 525; People v. Bennett, 119 Cal. App. 2d 
22-l-, 226, 259 P.2d -t-76; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 
§ 1130, p. 208. The failure of the witness to repeat the extra-
judicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value, 
for such failure may be explained by loss of memory or other cir-
cumstances. The extra-judicial identification tends to connect the 
defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting 
hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the 
trial for cross-examination. See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174-
175.146 :\.2d 29, 32-33; McCormick, Evidence§ 39, p. 74; Mor-
gan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wig-
more, E\idence (3d ed. 1940) § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State 
v. \Vilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 617-618, 231 P.2d 288, 300-301; 
People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202, 101 N.E.2d 457,460-
461." 
l'umerous other decisions appear to have followed these 
cases. judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29; Basoff v. 
State, 208 Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917; State v. McSloy, 127 
~font. 265, 261 P.2d 663; State v. Moon, 20 Ida. 202, 117 
Pac. i57; State l'. lt"'ilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 231 P.2d 288; 
Jrilliams l'. State, 3 72 P.2d 462 (Nev. 1962). 
It should be noted that the objection raised by the ap-
pellant for the first time on appeal is not accurately directed 
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to this point. Consequently, since numerous decisions from 
other courts have allowed the introduction of such evi-
dence, it can hardly be said that a basis for reversible error 
exists. Further, it should be noted that the picture con-
tained in Exhibits B, 1 through 8, by which the appellant 
was identified, does not have any police identification num-
ber on the picture, nor indicate that it was taken in con-
nection with criminal circumstances. 
The appellant himself introduced into evidence Exhibit 
D for the purposes of attacking the previous identification. 
That photograph, introduced by the appellant, does con-
tain attendant nomenclature connecting the appellant with 
a criminal investigation. Since this was introduced by the 
appellant, he is hardly in a position to claim error from 
some other less prejudicial action of the prosecution. 
The appellant argues that the identification of the ap-
pellant by a mug shot and the receipt of other pictures of 
individuals not identified, but possibly the subject of inquiry 
because of criminal activities, is raised to the level of preju-
dice by the fact that on cross-examination of the Ogden 
City Police Officer, Mr. Bruestle, he indicated that the 
accused was being investigated for other matters. 
It should be noted, first, that the trial court sustained an 
objection to the evidence and strictly admonished the jury 
to disregard the same. This court cannot presume that the 
jury did not follow the admonition. In People v. Gould, 
supra, the court noted : 
" * * * It must be assumed that ordinarily admonitions to the jury 
are heeded. People v. Foote, 48 Cal. 2d 20, 23, 306 P.2d 803; 
People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 597-598, 290 P.2d 50~; 
People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 499, 197 P.2d 1. A trial co~~t s 
decision that an error or impropriety can be cured by admo~1t~on 
will not be reversed unless exceptional circumstances make 1t Im-
probable that the jury obeyed the admonition. * * * " 
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See also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973; State 
v.l\elsey, 283 P.2d 982 (Wash.); State v. Bolds, 55 N.W.2d 
534 (Iowa). 
Secondly, it should be noted that the answer was a rea-
sonable response to a question elicited by the appellant on 
cross-examination. In State v. Myers, 385 ·P.2d 609 (Utah 
1963), the appellant contended that he was prejudiced by 
a similar response of a police officer made to a question 
asked of the officer by counsel during cross-examination. 
This court refused to find prejudice, and stated: 
"Inasmuch as it was his own attorney who asked the questions 
which brought forth the answers on cross-examination, he is in no 
position to complain of them." 
There is no merit to the appellant's contention on this 
point. There is no evidence of record which would tend 
to indicate that the pictures used to assist in the identifica-
tion of the appellant were brought to the attention of the 
jury in such a way as would lead the jury to believe that 
the appellant was intimately associated with persons of 
questionable repute. The question of prior identification 
was important to the prosecution as the issue of identifica-
tion was the sole issue in the trial. Since such evidence is 
normally admissible, it can hardly be said that the appel-
lant \vas prejudiced by the receipt of the evidence where 
there was no substantial indication which could lead the 
jury to believe that the photographs of the other persons, 
also displayed to Mr. Bramwell, were associates of the 
accused. This is obvious from the fact that no objection 
of any kind was made in the trial court. 
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POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM ERROR BECAUSE OF 
ANY FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY TO DISREGARD ANY INFERENTIAL ASSO-
CIATION OF THE APPELLANT WITH OTHER ALLEGED 
CRIMINALS. 
The appellant's contention that the trial court created 
some prejudice by failing to instruct the jury to disregard 
any inference of asociation of the accused with other crimi-
nals is without merit. No request for any such instruction 
was made. The trial court expressly asked counsel for both 
the State and the appellant whether they had any addi-
tional requests for instruction ( R. 54) . Both the State and 
the appellant indicated that they had no additional re-
quested instructions. Since the appellant requested no ad-
ditional instructions, he is in no position to claim error from 
the failure of the trial court to give an instruction. 
In State v. RowleyJ 386 P.2d 126 (Utah 1963), this 
court stated: 
"* * * No instruction was tendered by appellants in reference to 
a polygraph test and no exception was taken on the failure to give 
such an instruction. The general rule is that unless the party re-
quests an instruction on a special matter, he cannot predicate 
error upon the court's failure to charge. We see no reason to 
deviate from this rule and so adhere in rejecting appellants' second 
contention." 
In State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P.2d 727 ( 1947), 
this court was presented with a claim that the trial court 
committed error for failing to instruct on the limited pur-
pose of the use of the defendant's confession. No request for 
such an instruction had been made. The court noted: 
"This requirement that the court instruct 'upon the law applicable 
to the case' does not place upon the court alon~ the b~rden of 
making up instructions which cover every question wh1ch may 
have arisen in the case. 
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The ~cncral rule is that unless the party requests an instruction 
on a spl'rial n1atter he rannot predicate error upon the court's 
failurt' to charge. * * * l'he tenor of the cases \\'e have considered, 
and here cite, support our holding- that this case cannot be re-
turned for a new trial because of the court's failure to give a 
proper instruction limiting the use of l\Iiller's confession when no 
such instruction was requested. * * * " 
This has long been the rule of law in this jurisdiction. State 
v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P.2d 127; People v. Robin-
son, 6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; State v. Woodall, 6 U.2d 8, 
J()5 P.~d 473; State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P.2d 
50·~. 
Additionally, where no exception was taken to failure to 
instruct on the effect of such evidence, no error can be 
claimed. State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 P.2d 175 
( 1934) ; Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 
672. 
Consequently, appellant Owens is without a meritorious 
claim on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the contentions of the appellant, when 
,·ie,rcd against the record of the case, indicate that he has 
no basis upon \\·hich to claim a new trial. The evidence of 
his guilt is compelling and the appellant made no effort to 
exclude the evidence now claimed to be objectionable. 
The primary issue in the case \Vas the identification of the 
appellant and it, therefore, became directly material to 
receive the e\·idence of previous identification. The fact 
that pictures of other individuals \vho may have some crimi-
nal involvement \\·ere given to the jury could hardly be 
deemed prejudicial \\rhere there was no showing that these 
persons were in an)'\vay associated with or connected with 
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the appellant other than to provide a diversity of faces from 
which to test the victim's identification of the culprit. 
There is no merit to this appeal. The court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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